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In the Supreme Court
of the

State of Utah
. CAPITO·L ELECTRIC COMPANY,
a Corporation,
Appellant,

c·ase No.
vs.

7194

SUSAN J!. CAMPBELL,
Respond.~·nt.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF FACTS

.\

This case is one in which plaintiff seeks to ·recover
under the provisions of the Mechanic's Lien Statute for
labor and materials sold to David J. Campbell and in-.
stalled in the building owned by his wife Suzan M. Camp-_.
bell, the defendant herein. That the labor and materials
were used in altering, repairing and re-modeling the
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2
property at 729-731 North 2nd West, Salt Lake City,
Utah which was owned by the defendant Suza:p. ~f. Campbell. The plaintiff in its complaint seeks to recover the
sum of $522.33 with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from April 24, 1946 and the sum of $25.00 attorney
· fees together with costs and prayed that said sums be
adjudged a lien upon the premises and land of the defendant and that the same be foreclosed and that it have
execution for any deficiency.
Plaintiff's complaint alleges that on and between
. the 14th day of February, 1946 and the 24th day of
April, 1946 at the special instance and request of David
J. Campbell, the husband of the defendant, acting by
the defendant's authority as her agent and upon defendant's promise, given by her agent, David J. Campbell
to pay the reasonable value thereof. To this complaint
a general denial was filed by the defendant and trial was
had on the issues. On the trial of the issues the court
filed its Findings of Fact in which the court found.
1. ·That the said David J. Campbell "\vas not the
duly authorized agent of the said -defendant and that
the said plaintiff did not sell the said electrieal supplies
and furnish the said labor and materials to David Campbell as the duly authorized agent of the defendant Suzan
M. Campbell but sold said electrical supplies and furnished said labor to David J. Campbell personally and
relied solely upon the personal credit of Mr. David J.
Camp hell.
STATEMENT OF POINT IN"\TOL 'TFJD
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The only qn~stion for deter1ninn tion by this court
is 'Yhether there is sufficient evidence in the record to
sustain the findings of the trial court that David J.
Ca1npbell 'Yas not acting as the duly authorized agent
of the defendant Susan ~I. Ca1npbell and that the said
plaintiff did not sell the said electrical n1aterial and furnish the labor to DaYid J. Campbell as the duly authorized agent of the defendant.
~\RGU~iENT

. A.t the outset I agree 'vith counsel for the respon-

dent that the mechanic's Lien Statute of this state, Title
52 U.C ..A.. 1943 contemplates that the lien may attach
to an o'Yners interest in property for labor performed
or materials furnished to the owner or his duly authorized agent, but the respondent insists that under the
facts as they appear in this record_·no such ·agency has
heen established by a preponderance of th~ evidence,
as contemplated by the mechanic's Lien statute.
Counsel in his brief on page 9 argues that this being
an equity action to foreclose a mechanic's Lien this court
:;;hould review the facts and direct findings to be made
in accordance 'vith the facts as interpreted by this court
and counsel cites Bancroft's Code Practice and Renledies \:ol. ;) section 3625, pages 4839 and 4840. The deci:;;ions of this court are so numerous on this question
that it is not necessary to cite further authority. This
court has fixed certain limitations upon the ~eope of
rrYif\\' hy thi~ court in an equity case.
'· 'rh e seone of revi e \\' on appeal in equi t~·
en~·p~ i~ clearl~y settled in this jurisdiction. The
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:-; upre1ne Court i:-; authorized by the state constitution to review the findings of the Trial Court
in Equity cases, but the Findings of the Trial
Courts upon confl,icting evidence will not be set
aside unles;4 it ma~ifestly appears. that the c.ourt
had nlisapplied proven fact~ or made findings
rlearl~· against the weig_ht of the evidence.''
. (Huber v. Ne"\\rman, 106 Utah 363, 145 Pac. 2nd
780).
See also Stanley v. Stanley~ 94 Pac. -(2nd) 465; Baldwin v. Nelson, 170 Pac. (2nd) 179.
It is the contention of the respondent that there
is sufficient evidence in this record to sustain the Findings of the trial court. On the 24th day of November,
1945 the defendant Susan Campbell acquired title to
the property upon \Vhich the lien sought to be foreclosed
\Vas placed. and that she immediately thereafter recorded
her deed, placing it on the records of Salt Lake County
and the sa1ne was of record at the time the plaintiff n1ade
the contract \vith l\f r. Campbell and furnished the !naterials sued for in plaintiff's con1plaint. l\Ir. David ,J.
Ca1npbell \vas a contractor and builder and the Capitol
Electric Co. had done \vork for ~fr. Campbell fron1 tin1e
to tilne and had just completed t\vo jobs for l\1 r. Canlpbell, the Center Street job and the 4th north job. Both
of these pieces· of property were in the na1ne of ::\1 r.
David J. Campbell as shown by the transcript, page 23.
On both of these two j·obs the materials were furnished
and the labor performed solely on the personal credit
of Mr. Campbell. Mr. Campbell personally paid for all
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of the labor and 1naterials on both jobs \Vith the exception of a fe\v dollars as l\Ir. Latin1er testified.
,\. . hen ·these t"?·o jobs \vere about completed Mr.'
Ca1npbell 'vent to the Capitol Electric Co., and ordered
the 'vork done on the property at 729 North 2nd
''rest, the property on 'vhich the appellant now seeks
to forerlose its lien and ~Ir. Latimer testified that at
the time the 'vork 'vas ordered there \vere no different
arrange1nents made than when the work was done on the
other t\vo jobs \\·here the title was in the name of Mr.
Campbell and where the materials 'vere sold on his personal rredit and ~Ir. Campbell paid him (transcript page
23.)
~Irs.

Can1pbell was· not present when the arrangements were n1ade for the work on the property on \vhich
plaintiff now seeks to foreclose its lien (transcript page
26). The job was entered upon the books of the Capitol
Electric Co. as a sale to David J. Campbell and he was
charged \vith the labor and materials. 11 rs. Ca1nphell
was never 'vith ilf r. Campbell at any time either at the
place of business of the Capitol Electric Co. nor on the
property at 729 North 2nd West (transcript page 10).
She did not in any manner participate in the remodeling
or give any instructions either to nf r. Latimer or to the
worlnnen. When ·the \Vork \vas not paid· for, l\fr. Latimer
did not make any demand upon :h!rs. Can1pbell for payment because as Mr. Latimer testified (transcript page
25) he had been dealing \vith l\T r. Campbell and had extended the credit to l\Ir. Catnpbell.
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On the 24th day of June, 1946 when ~fr. Latimer
signed the affidavit for the lien upon the property at
729 North 2nd West, Mr. Latimer knew that Mrs. Campbell owned the property but made no demand upon her
for payment because as he said he had been dealing
with Mr. Campbell and extended the credit to him, and
Mr. Latimer swore under oath that he had sold the Inaterials and performed the labor for Mr. David J. Campbell and _made no mention of any agency between ~fr.
and Mrs. Campbell at that time.
Counsel for the appellant -has carefully on pag-es 4
and 5 of his brief set forth all of the evidence in the
record 'vhich is in any respect favorable to a finding.
that the Capitol Electric Company sold the materials
and performed the labor sued for by the plaintiff to
David J. Campbell as· the duly authorized agent of the
defendant.
But this evidence falls far short of being sufficient
for establishing an agency between Mr. and Mrs. Can1pbell, by a preponderance of the evidence. The conclusion
most favorable to· the plaintiff that can be drawn from
this evidence is that Mrs. Campbell owned the property
and permitted her husband David J. Campbell to manage it for her, and that' she signed papers for the sale
of the property.·
This evidence ha.s never been held sufficien"t to establish an agency between a hushand and wife so as to
create a lien upon her property.
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The rule generally follo\vPd in detern1ining \vhether
the husband is acting as the agent of her husband so as
to create a lien upon her propert~T i~ ~et. forth, in 36
...-\.J., ~fechanic Liens, Sec. 101, page 78:
'The relationship of principal and agent het,veen a husband and wife has been not inferable
fron1 Yarious circumstances. Thus it has been
declared that the husbands authority to act as
the \vife 's agent is not to be ilnplied from the
n1arital relation or the 1nere fact that he occupied
or n1anaged and controlled his \vife 's property."
j,

The only evidence in this record favorable to a finding that 1[r. Campbell was acting as the agent of ~fr~.
Campbell is some evidence indicating that Mrs. Campbell permitted ~Ir. Campbell to manage her property.
See Hoffman v. ~IcFadden, 56 Ark. 217; 19 S.W. 753, 4
A.L.R. 1039. Caldwell v. Overall, 99 Pa.c. (2nd) 496.
In Cald,v·ell v. Overall the court said:
dlt is settled that before a lien can be p:-;tablished against real estate the contraet must be
Inade \vith the owner or his duly authorized agent
and that the right to the lien depends upon such
contract( Deka Development Co. v. Fox, 170 Okla.
228, 39 Pac. (2nd) 143. While the husbands
authority to act for his wife is not implied from
the marriage relation nor front fhe n1ere fact tha,t
he occupied and nJan~a.rJed the 1rife's property. Yet
in many instances the agency of the husband is
inferred from the circumstances. As \vhen the
'vife i\:new that the lien claimant \vas \vorking on
thp prop0rty and personally g-ave directions as
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to parts of the work. When she participated in
conversations between the c-ontractors and the
husband relative to the work while it was being
done or when she furnished what money was
paid.''
The evidence in this case is to the effect that Mrs.
Campbell was never on the property and at no time had
any c.onversations with the plaintiff or the workmen or
participated in any conversations between the plaintiff
or his w·orkmen and Mr. Campbell relative to the work
'vhile it 'vas going on, and there is no evidence that l\{rs.
Campbell furnished any money toward the improvements. l\f r. Latimer te.stified that all of the money paid
to him 'vas paid _by Mr. Campbell and there is no evidence that any of the money was furnished by 1Irs.
Campbell.
While the question as to ~hether Mrs. Campbell
was acting as the agent of Mrs. Campbell· is one of fact
the courts have held that certain circumstances are sufficient to constitute such an agency and others are not.
36 A.J. l\{echanic Laws, Section 100, page 78 sets
forth the circumstances that the courts have held sufficient to create an agency between the husband and wife:
''There are numerous circumstanc-es fron1
which agency of the husband to contract for his
wife n1ay he inferred or implied among these
are the giving by the wife of personal directions
to the claimant as to parts of the work, participation in conversations between her husband and
the contractors relative to the work during thr
time it was being done without raising objections
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to her liability; the furnishing of n1oney to be
paid on the building or ilnproven1ent the fact that
her husband had no interest in the particular
piece of property upon "~hich the iinproveinent
"·as Inade: the deliverY of most of the material
. directly to the "~ife a~d th.e joining of the 'vife
",.ith her husband in the execution of a lease which
provided for erection of the building.''
Not a single one of the foregoing circumstances as
indicating an agency "~as established by the evidence in
this record. :Jirs. Campbell gave no personal directions;
she did not participate in any conversations between her
husband and ~fr. Latimer or his workmen. She was not
present "'"hile the \vork was being carried· on, and she
gave no suggestion and gave no- orders. She paid no
money and \Vas not present when the contract was made.
In :Jf echanic 's Liens A.J., page 74 section 101 sets
forth the various circumstances which the courts have
held insufficient to establish a lien upon a 'vife 's property:
''The relationship of principal and agent bet\veen a husband and wife has been :held not inferrable fron1 various circumstances;; Thus it has
been declared that the husband's authority to act
as the wifes agent is not to be implied from the
1narital relation, the mere fact that he occupied
or managed or controlled, his "rife's real estate,
the offer of suggestions by the wife concerning
the building or improvements, or the exhibition
of interest hy the \vife in the \Vork.
"It is generally held that the tnere kno,vledge
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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of a n1arried woman that a husband is making
improvements upon her property is insufficient
to establish the fact that he is acting as her agent.
.Nor does her failure to dissent from the proposed
transactions import an intention to bind her property.
''A number of circumstances have been held
to disprove the agency of the husband, as for example, the fact that the claimant did not know
that the materials in question were to be used on
the wifes property. That the claimant did not
know that the wife did not know that the wife
owned the land on which the improvements were
made, that the wife had no knowledge that the
huspand purchased the materials on credit, took
no part in the planning or construction of the
building, suggested no alterations during progress of the 'vork, contributed no money toward
the improvement, gave no directions as to the
work, or took no part in the purchase of the matrrials used; and that the husband signed the
con tract and treated the house as his own.
''Other circumstances which have been held
not suffieien t to prove the hus fiands agency are
the facts that the 'vife owned the real estate on
\Yhich the improvements were made. That the
house on \vhich the improvements 'vere served as
a family residence, that the wife said that her
husband wanted the \vork and that she said that
she would see them paid, as well as that if her
husband were suited all \vould be suited. Of
course, where the credit is given to the husand
alone, no mechanic's lien can attach to the \Yifr':-;
property.''
Every single circumstance set forth in this section
in which the courts have held to be cirr.tunstanre's fron1
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\vhich agency is not inferred ""aB eBtnblished by ·the evidence in this ree-ord. That the clain1ant did not kno\v
that ~Irs. Can1pbell owned the property was established
by the testhnony of :\1 r. Lathner. That ~Irs. Can1pbell had
kno\Yledge that ~Jr. Can1pbell had purchased the Inaterials on credit is not sho,vn b~,. the evidence. The evidence sho""S that :Jirs. Campbell kne"" that alterations
""ere being n1ade but it does not sho\v that she kne'v from
'vhon1 they ""ere being obtained or \vhether they \Vere
purchased on credit or not. That :Jlrs·. Campbell to.ok no
part in the planning or construction of the building, suggested no alterations during the progress of the work,
contributed no n1oney to,vard the improve1nent; gave r. o
directions as to the 'vork or took_ no part in the purchase
of the materials used is all sho,vn 'vithout dispute in the
eYidence.
When the circumstances \vhich the courts have generally held to be guides in determining whether an
agency. exists between a husband and wife are applied
to the facts as they appear in this rec.ord not a single
circumstance is sho,vn except the cire-umstance that Mrs.
Ca1npbell permitted ~Ir. Campbell to manage her property and this has been held by the great weight of authority to be insufficient to establish such an agency so
as to create a mechanic's lien upon the wife's property.
There is no dispute that the arrangements were all
1nade by l\lr. Ca1npbell \Vith ~fr. liatimer and l\Irs. Calnphell \Vas never present at any time and that ~ir. Lathner
sold the goods and perfo~med the labor for l\fr. CampSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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bell on his personal credit. These circumstances have
always been considered by the courts to be strong circumstances indicating that no agency existed. In fact,
the circumstar1ce that the labor and materials were furnished on ~the personal credit of the husband has been
held by some courts to be sufficient in and of itself to
preclude an agency of the husband so as to create a
mechanic's lien on the wife's property. In the case of
Kansas City Planing :Jfill Co. vs. Brundage, 25 Mo.
Appeals 268, the court said:
''It was his personal undertaking and shows
that the contractor looked to him for his pay. It
is the accepted rule of law that an action to enforce a mechanic's lien can only be brought
against the debtor."
In this same case the court also said:
"That the existence of the express contract
\Vith the husband renders it impossible to charge
the wife with an obligation to pay for the improvements. Likewise an express contract with
the husband, where he relies entirely upon his
credit and extended him personal credit this p·recludes the idea of an agency.''
This principle was early recognized in the early
case of Hoffman v. McFadden, 56 Ark. 217, 19 S.W. 753,
a case very similar in its facts to the case now before
the court, where the court said:
''The contract for the work was made with
the husband and the labor of the carpenters was
all paid for by him. All of the materials purchased
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fro1n the plaintiff and others were procured on

the husbands order and for aught that appears
they "~ere sold entirely upon his personal credit.
The defendant testified that she objected to the
erection of the improvements for reasons which
she states. She also states that her husband was·
not authorized as her agent and that she was not
consulted about the contract for the improvements and had no kno,vledge of its terms. It is
our opinion that upon the proof aduced the plaintiff 'vas not entitled to relief."
See also the recent case of Caldwell vs. Overail,
Okla., 1940, 99 Pac. 2nd 496.
This court has followed the rule that \Vhere the
credit is extended to the husband and the claimant relies
entirely upon the personal credit of the husband, no
lien attaches to the 'vife's property. In the case of
J[orrison vs. Clark, 20 Utah 432, 59 Pac. 235, this court
said:
"~I any

authorities are cited by the respondents upon this question but an examination of
then1 sho,vs that in nearly every case the question
decided turned either upon a statute authorizing
the husband to make the contract or upon the
husband's agency or upon the wife's consent or
ratification of the contract. In this case the facts
found are not broad enough to implicate the 'vife
RO as to bring her \vi thin the rule as con tended
for by the respondents. In Wadsworth v. Hodge;
88 Ala. 500, 7 Southern 194, it is held that 'the
contract must be originally that of the wife by
herf-'elf or hy her dui~~ authorized agent, or else
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the husband or other agent must assume to contract for her and in her own behalf and such contract subsequently ratified by her with full knowledge of a con tract of this character no lien will
attach to her property and where the credit is
given to the husband he alone is bound.' Although
it may appear that the wife knew· that the building
or improvements were in process of erection on
her land and said nothing or that she and other
members of the family afterward occupied the
property as a dwelling. This view is not only
consonant with reason and justice but is also
every\vhere supported by the authorities.''
The lien was denied by the court in the Morrison
case upon the grounds that the credit had been extended
to the husband on his personal credit. That this was the
grounds for the decision· of the court is clearly shown
by the cases ",.hich this court cited in support of its
decision. ·This court_ cited the case of Went vs. Martin,
89 Ill. 139 and in this case the court said :
''The contract in this case had no reference
to the land to which the petitioners· now seek to
subject to a lien and on the authority of Burkhart vs. Reesig, 24 Ill. 529, the land cannot be
liable for the indebtedness. It is the contract of
the parties and the furnishing., of the labor and
materials that creates the lien under the statute
and the lien cannot be· created or inforced unless
the contract . falls 'vithin the provisions of the
statute. The owner of, the premises made no contract for lumber~ It was not sold upon her credit,
but on the contrary. it is apparent that the sale
.. was made ..to Frederick Went upon an open ac-count.''
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In the en~(~ of ,,,.. ads\Yorth YB. Hodge, cited by the
court in the 1lorrison rnse, the court said:
'~'''""here

the credit is given solely to the husband he alone i~ bound.''
The plain \Yording of the decision in the ::\I orrison
ease "~hen construed in the light of the cases cited by
the court in support of its decision clearly shows the
court's intention of follo,ving the generally accep~ted rule
of lR\V that ""here the credit is extended to the husband
on his personal credit no lien attaches to the wife's property. See also 36 A.J. )!echanic Liens, Section 101 and
Hollings,vorth v. Young Hard,vare Co., 198 S.W. 716,
-! A.L.R. 1018; Cald,Yell vs. Overall, 99 Pac. (2nd) 49G ..
The testmony in this recor-d ""ithout dispute establishes the fact that ~I r. Latimer sold the materials and
performed the labor for :llir. David J. Campbell and relied solely upon his personal eredi t.
Counsel for the appellant has cited the case of Cald\\"ell vs. Overall, 99 Pac. (2496) as establishing an agency
under facts as they appear in this record but a careful
exa1nina tion of this case clearly distinguishes it from
a case with facts as they appear in this record. In the
Caldwell vs. Overall case the court simply decided that
the record of the trial court was sufficient to create a
lien upon the wife's property 'vithout stating any of the
faets so that we do not kno'v how the court arrived at
its conclusion that the husband 'vas acting as the agent
of the \vife. The follo,ving language of the court, ho,vPYrr, indicates that the court found that an agency exSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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iHted because of either an estoppel or a ratification of
the· contract by the wife after the contract had been
made.
~'Without

going into detail it is sufficient to
say that the facts and circumstances as well as
the admissions of the defendant lead to the conclusion that the work was done for her and that
she knew that. the plaintiff had been employed for
such purposes by the husband and accepted his
services with such knowledge.''
It is evident from this language that the court upheld the lien upon the theory that the wife had consented to the work and received the benefits of the contract and was therefore held to be the agent of her husband because she had ratified his contract. This cle.arly
distinguishes the case from the case now before the
court. In the case !low before the court the .plaintiff
did not allege that- l\1rs. Campbell had ratified a contract which was made by Ivfr. Campbell nor did the plaintiff allege an estoppel. The plaintiff framed the issues
of the case purely on the theory that.Mr. Campbell made
the contract with the plaintiff for the materials -and
labor with Mr. Campbell as the agent of Mrs. Campbell
and the plaintiff must stand or fall upon these allegations of his complaint and cannot rely upon a ratification
by Mrs. Campbell·of a contract made with Mr. Campbell
and subseq11;ently ratified by her silence and receiving
the benefits of the con tract and any evidence in this recSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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ord tending to sho\Y that :\f rs. Can1pbell was ~ilent and
received the benefits of the contract thereby ratifying
her husband's contract is entirely i1nmaterial and should
be disregarded by this court and has no probative value
in deter1nining \Yhether at the time the \Vork was ordered
"Jir. Campbell \Yas acting as the duly authorized agent
of jf rs. Campbell.
In the case of Cald\Yell vs. Overall cited and relied
upon by counsel for appellant 'vhile holding that ·the
"~ife had ratified the contract of her husband by her
silence and her acceptance of the benefits of the improvenlents and sustained the lien on the theory that she had
ratified her husband's contract then used the following
language:
"It is settled that before a lien can be established against real estate, the contract must be
made \vith the owner or the duly authorized a.gent,
and that the right to the lien depends upon such
contract. Deka Development Co. vs. Fox, 170
Old. 228, 39 Pac. (2nd) 143. While the husbands
authority to act for the \vife is not implied fron1
the marital relation, nor from the 1nere fact that
he occupied or managed and eontrolled his wife's
propert~~, yet in many instances the agency of the
husband is inferred from the circu1nstances, as
\Vhen the "~ife knew that the lien claimant was
working on the building and personally gave him
instructions as to parts of the vvork, vvhen she
participated in conversations bet\veen the contractors and her husband relative to the \Vork
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

18
\vhilc it was being done, or when she furnished
what Inoney was paid on some material and the
building of the house.''
This statement of law by the court was taken by
the court from 18 R.C.L. 901 and 40 C.J., page 99, section 87, and represents the great weight of authority.
Applying the facts as they appear in this record to the
law as expressed by the court in the Caldwell case, cited
by counse.l the trial court did not err in its findings of
fact and conclusions of law. There is not a single circumstance in this record indicating an agency within
the language of the .court in the Caldwell case except
that Mrs. Campbell permitted her husband to manage
her property ·and this was by the court expressly declared
to be insufficient. ~irs. Campbell was not present 'vhen
the contract was made; she gave no directions as to the
work; she participated in no conversations between her
husband and the plaintiff and she furnished no money.
Counsel has attempted to distinguish this case from
the case of ~1orrison vs. Clark but there is very little
difference. The fact that Mr. Clark contracted in writing seems to make little difference, for in both cases the
contract was with the husband alone and on his own
behalf and the credit was extended to the husband in
both cases and the court . denied the lien in the Morrison
case upon the ground that the credit was extended to
the husband alone .. ·Counsel seeks to further distinguish
the case from the Morrison case and on the bottom of
page 14 of his brief counsel says that in the Clark case
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~[rs.

Clark believed that her hu~band "Tas and he "Ta~
in fact financially able to pay for the labor and materials
furnished "Thile in this case ~Irs. Carnpbell knew that
her husband "Ta~ financially en1barrassed and unable to
pay for the \York and n1aterials. This statement of coun~e l is not sustained by the record.

Q. \Y.hen did you discover :\frs. Can1pbell that
you did 0\Vn the property u?
. :\..

~

:\f r. Ca1npbell \Van ted to borrow some n1oney
on it to do some improvements and he 'van ted
me to sign a note so he could fix it up and
he told n1e it \Vas in n1y name. (Transcript,
page 5.)

~frs.

Campbell \vas apparently confused when she
so testified because on page 9 of the transcript she states
the true facts that the n1oney there referred to 'vhich
she talked about borrowing was the money which she
horro\ved from Trac~T Collins Trust Co., for the purpose
of paying for the property.

Q. At the time of the execution of this deed fron1
S. D. Rideout to you you had to mortgage
the property 'vith Tracy Loan & Trust Co.
did you not to pay off the previous notes~
.A..

Yes.

This is the onl~T evidence in the record that Mrs.
an1pbell ever furnished any money or paid any bills,
and this was for the purchase of the property.. But the
evidence is that 1Ir. Campbell had just completed two
jobs for I\fr. Campbell and that he had been paid in full
for both of these jobs writh the exception of a fe\V dollars
1

(
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by ~1r. Campbell. So that the evidence does not show
that 11r. Campbell was unable to pay for the work and
that ~frs. Campbell knew it.
The purport of a number of. cases is that the land
of a married woman upon which a party erects a building in pursuance of a contract made with her husband
cannot be subjected to a lien where her title is of record
in the absence of positive fraud (50 A.L.R. 9'60). In this
same connection see Alexander vs. Andelusia Mfg. Co.,
supra, 195 Ala. 477, 70 S. 140, where the court used the
following "language:
''The wife not only knew of the repairs which
her husband was having done on ·her property
and said nothing but was constantly present while:
the repairs were being made and gave directions
as to how it was to be done. In deciding the case
the court while not commending the conduct of
the wife and husband said: 'Yet the long established rules should not be wrenched from their
effects or denied efficacy to avert what proper
caution and precaution on the part of the materialman would have made impossible in this instance. The materialman should have ascertained
beforehand that the proposed improvements were
to be on the property not owned by the husband.
To their lack of care for their own interest is to
be attributed the opportunity this husband and
wife have been afforded of receiving the benefits
at the expense in part of the materialman'."
The reasoning of the court in this case is sound in
principle. Where the title to the property owned by the
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\rife i~ on record and thPrt• i ~ no fraud or eonet>alntPn t.
there should rest upon a n1ateriahuan \Yho deals with
the husband the duty to use at least ordinary care to
detern1ine before the Inaterials are furnished "\Vhether
the husband is acting as h~r agent or not. nfr. Latimer
did not use co1nn1on ordinary care to deterinine whether
~[r. Can1pbell \vas acting as·the duly authorized agent of
~frs. Can1pbell or not. At the time these materials and
labor \\~ere furnished :Jfrs. Ca1npbell \\'"as the record 'o,vner of the property and this :\Ir. Latimer kne\v or shol1ld
haYe kno\vn. :Jfr. Latiiner also kne\v that in order to have
a lien upon the property of ~Irs. Campbell the contract
1nu~t be \Yith her or her duly authorized agent. At the
time ~Ir. Latimer entered .into the contract \Vith nir.
Can1pbell for the 'vork and materials he should have deterinined 'vhether he 'vas acting a.s the duly ~uthorized
agent of :Jirs. Campbell and this could have been done
hy sin1ply asking ~f rs. Campbell whether she had authorized Jf r. Ca1npbell to n1ake the imp'rovements. At
the tilne the c"ontract \Yas entered into with nf r. Campbell
for the improvement~ this question of whether :\f r. Camphell ",.a~ acting as the duly authorized agent of l\[rs.
Ca1nphe1l coula of been so easily deter1nined by ~f r.
Latilner \Vith the exercise of ordinary care that it no"\v
:-;rein~ a travesty on. justice for this- plaintiff to no\v
ask this court to hold that 1f rs. Campbell was the undi~elosed principal and ~r r. Ca1npbell \Vas acting as her
agent upon ~uch evidence as appears in· this record.
RnrPl~·

un(ler

~ueh

eircu1nstances fhe court should require
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very p~sitive and definite evidence to establish such an
agency and such an agency should not be established
from the conduct of the \vife unless such conduct amounts
to positive fraud or vvras such as to mislead the plainti.ff
into believing that at the time the contract \Vas entered
into and the materials furnished he was authorized to
act as her agent. See Swenton vs. Hale, 280 Pac. 437.
There is no such evidence in this record.
The record in this case shows that 1\1rs. Campbell
\Vas entirelv·"' under the don1ination of her -husband and
that she signed the contract for the sale of the property
just to keep peace in the family.
'

In the case of Coorcen vs. Zieke, 79 S. 562 at page
563, the court said :
,. 'So far as we are advised, she may have
supposed that the \Vork was being done upon the
personal credit of the husband for that reason
no elen1ent of estoppel can intervene; not having
been consulted as fo the improve1nents and being
under such arbitrary dorninion as the evidence
sho\vs she \vas she· was not bound to have a row
\vith her husband and order the workmen from the
premises at the risk of having her property incuinbered by a lien. Being a married \voman she was
not free to act entirely ·as she pleased noh,Tithstanding the liberality of modern legislation,
married women are somewhat under the dominion
and control of their husbands and such relation
n1ust be considered when it is sought to bind her
property.''
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This (lase does not prPsent n situation "~here 1\f rs.
Ca1npbell through a course of dealing had led ~lr. I..Jatitner to believe that ~lr. Ca1npbell '"'as authorized to act
a~ her agent but in this respect the evidence of Mrs.
Ca1npbell is a little misleading and apparently· 1\lrs.
Can1pbell " . as confused. ·On page 13 of the transcript
~f r~. Can1pbell testified:

Q.

.A. nd you also had in this same neighborhood
t\vo other pieces of property at the same
time, did you not~
_A_. Xo, sir, :Jfr. Campbell had them and put them
In n1y name.

The fact is that these pieces of property were not
i the name of ~Irs. Can1pbell as shown by the testimony
of :Jir. Latimer at bottom of page 22 of the transcript.

Q. 'Y"ith the value of the property in mind. Mr.
A.

Q.

A.

Q.
·A.

Ca1npbell owned the property on 4th North,
didn't he1
I don't know.
\Y.ell, let me refresh your memory, then. This
is a lien you filed on the property. You
recite in there that l\1r. Campbell \vas the
legal owner of the property.
That is right.
~r r. Campbell was the legal o\vner of the
property, wasn't he~
Yes, sir, on that.

So that this is not a. case where ~Irs. Campbell
O\vned a number of pieces of property and through a
rourse of dealings bet,veen her husband and Mr. Latimer
had led ~~ r. I..Jatimrr to believe that ~fr. C-ampbell 'va~
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her agent. There was nothing in the previous conduct
of 1frs. Campbell in the previous dealings of Mr. Campbell and Mr. Latimer that would justify Mr. Latimer in
assu1ning that Mrs. Campbell was authorized as her
agent.
Counsel ·on page 15 of his brief argues that !{r.
Campbell had no estate from which plaintiff might recover. That Mrs. Campbell's property had received the
benefit of the labor and materials. It is true that the
property re~eiv.ed the benefit of the labor and material.
But the evidence was that ~rs. Campbell was compelled
to ~eed the property back to 11:r. R~deout by warranty
deed because she was unable to make the payments.
·Mrs. Campbell in fact received no benefit from the
work and materials furnished by; the plaintiff and if this
court should sustain the lien upon the property and
enter a judgment against the defendant the result would
be a judgment which Mrs. Campbell would personally
have to pay. This is a situation the courts have alwayR
endeavored to avoid. To sustain a lien under the facts
as they appear in this record would re:p.der unsafe the
separate estate of any married woman who is under
the domin.ation of her husband as was 1{rs. Campbell.
Surely in such a case where ~the wife has put the ti\tl~
to her property on record and !{r. Latimer knew or
should have known that she was the owner, Mr. Latimer
cannot completely 'close his eyes and disregard this fact
and deal with her husband as the owner without even
consulting her and then aft~r ·the death of .Mr. Camphell
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

atten1pt tn reroYrr fron1 ~lr~. CniHpbell on the thPor~r
that he \\·a~ arting n~ hPr agPnt unle~~ he can sho\\· that
:\f r~. Can1phell by her act~ and eon duct prior to thP
tilne the plaintiff t•xtended the credit \YPre ~nch a~ to
lead hin1 to belirYP that ~r r. ("'ian1phell "·as in fact arting
a~ her agent in ordering the \\·ork and \\·hpre her title is
of record nothing ~hort of po~itiYe fraud should he sufficient to e~tabli~h ~uch an ag·ency and in1posp upon lVf r~.
Ca1npbell the obligation of personally a~~un1ing a lo~~
w·hich 'vith the exercise of conunon ordinar~· prudence
and bu~ines~ practices the plaintiff n1ight have avoided
hy consulting ~r rs. Can1pbell before he dealt \Yith her
hu~hand.

COXCLUSION
In conclu~ion I submit that the great preponderance
of the evidence in this record when considered in the
light of the authorities 'vherein the ·courts have refused
to ~n~tain a lien upon the \vife 's property, is sufficient to
~u~tain the Findings of the trial court that the plaintiff
did not ~ell the n1aterial~ and furnish the labor to ~f rr.
Ca1nphell a~ the duly authorized agent of the defendant
~r r~. Susan Campbell and the couTt committed no error
in l'efu~ing to render a judgrnent for the plaintiff and
rendering a judgment in favor of the defendant, no cause
for aetion.
Respectfully svbmitted,

DFJ.AN E. Fiu\NDERS,
.A ttornf.lJ fo.r Respondent.
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